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The question as to how society should support pharmaceutical (‘pharma’) innovation is 
both pertinent and timely: Pharma drugs are an integral component of modern health 
care and hold the promise to treat more effectively various debilitating health problems.  
The productivity of the pharma R&D enterprise, however, has declined since the 1980s. 
Many observers question whether the patent system is conducive to pharma innovation 
and point to several promising alternative mechanisms.  These mechanisms include 
both ‘push’ programs – subsidies directed towards the cost of pharma R&D – and ‘pull’ 
programs – lumpsum and royalty-based rewards for the outputs of pharma R&D, that is, 
new drugs.  I review evidence why our current system of pharma patents is defective 
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Résumé: 
La question de savoir comment la société devrait promouvoir l’innovation dans le 
domaine des produits pharmaceutiques tombe à point nommé pour plusieurs raisons: 
les produits pharmaceutiques font partie intégrante des systèmes de santé modernes et 
tiennent la promesse de traiter plus efficacement un certain nombre de problèmes de 
santé débilitants. Cependant, la productivité des compagnies pharmaceutiques est en 
baisse depuis les années 80. Beaucoup d'observateurs se demandent aujourd’hui si le 
système d’attribution des brevets existant est en mesure de générer les incitations 
nécessaires en faveur de l'innovation et proposent des solutions remplacement 
alternatives. Ces solutions comprennent des programmes de subventions des coûts de 
R & D dans le domaine pharmaceutique (push programs) et l'allocation de primes suite 
à la création des produits pharmaceutiques issus de la R & D, par exemple, de 
nouveaux médicaments. Je passe en revue les éléments de preuves qui démontrent 
dans quelle mesure le système de brevets pharmaceutiques actuellement en place est 
déficient et présente des solutions de remplacements qui pourraient  stimuler 
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The development of new pharmaceutical (‘pharma’) drugs, coupled with advances in 
disease management, has undoubtedly contributed to the impressive growth in the 
length and quality of life observed in most developed countries since the second world 
war (Cutler, Deaton and Lleras-Muney 2006; Cutler et al 2007; Lichtenberg 2008).  In 
the last three decades, however, the productivity of the pharma R&D enterprise – the 
number of therapeutically important new molecules brought to market per dollar spent 
on R&D – has declined markedly (Figure1; FDA 2004, Baker 2007, Garnier 2008).  This 
productivity slowdown has occurred despite the advent of genomic technologies, 
structure-guided methods, combinatorial chemistry approaches, knock-out mice and 
other technologies that held the promise to boost output (Edwards 2008).  
 
Figure 1  Number of new molecular entities (NMEs) approved in the US, and real 
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Data Source:  NME: U.S. Food and Drug Administration Centre for Drug Evaluation Research. 
New Molecular Entity Drug and New Biologic Approvals in Calendar Year. 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/
DrugandBiologicApprovalReports/NMEDrugandNewBiologicApprovals/default.htm.  R&D: 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), Annual survey report, 
Washington, D.C., various years. http://www.phrma.org.  GDP deflator (used to convert 3 
 
nominal R&D spending into real): US Bureau Economic Analysis, National Economic Accounts, 
National Income and Product Accounts Table 1.1.4. Price Indexes for Gross Domestic Product. 
 
This productivity slowdown raises questions about how pharma innovation should be 
encouraged.  To many observers, but especially those in the pharma industry, there is 
no question – the development of important new drugs requires stronger patent 
protection.  There is a growing body of evidence, however, that patents provide only 
weak incentives for innovative activity in general, and the development of new drugs in 
particular.  At worst, patents can actually stifle innovation (Baker 2007, Bessen and 
Meurer 2008, Boldrin and Levine 2008, Boyle 2008, Gold 2008, Heller 2008, Jaffe and 
Lerner 2006, Lipinski 2006, Palombi 2009). 
The question as to how society should support pharma innovation is both pertinent and 
timely.  Pharma drugs are an integral component of medicine.  They are routinely used 
to manage chronic conditions, prevent infectious disease, and hold the promise to treat 
more effectively Alzheimer’s disease, schizophrenia, arthritis and various other 
debilitating health problems.  Pharma firms, private foundations and governments spend 
large sums on pharma R&D, both directly (e.g., intra-mural programs, research grants, 
R&D tax credits) and indirectly (prescription drug subsidies and tax subsidies of 
employer-provided drug insurance).  Providing the appropriate incentives and economic 
environment for drug discovery is therefore crucial.   
Several different mechanisms to support pharma R&D have been proposed.  These 
include both ‘push’ programs – subsidies directed towards the cost of pharma R&D, 
including biomedical research and clinical trials – and ‘pull’ programs – lumpsum 
rewards and royalty based schemes for new drugs.  In other words, the alternatives can 
be broadly distinguished by whether they subsidize the inputs or the outputs of the 
pharma R&D process.  In this paper, I outline the argument against patents and review 
how these alternative mechanisms might yield more important new drugs per dollar 
spent on R&D. 
 
2. Description and rationale for patents 
Pharma patents allow developers a time-limited period of market exclusivity, or 
monopoly, over the sale of the drug.  During this time, innovators can charge a price 
well above marginal drug production and distribution costs (MC) without fear of being 
undercut by competitors.  This margin between price and MC, or ‘profit’, earned on each 
unit of the drug sold can be used to recover sunk R&D costs.  Indeed, this is the pharma 
industry’s mantra: high margins fuel drug innovation. 
Most national governments agree that patents are necessary for innovation.  For 
instance, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) asserts: “The 
strength and vitality of the U.S. economy depends directly on effective mechanisms that 
protect new ideas and investments in innovation and creativity. The continued demand 
for patents and trademarks underscores the ingenuity of American inventors and 4 
 
entrepreneurs. The USPTO is at the cutting edge of the Nation’s technological progress 
and achievement.”
1 
The Canadian Intellectual Property Office (CIPO) claims “Patents fuel progress”.  It 
states: “By giving inventors monopolies on their creations for a specific time period, 
patents protect investments and allow inventors to profit financially from their creativity. 
This in turn provides an attractive incentive for research and development, ultimately 
benefiting all Canadians. Without the possibility of patent protection, many people might 
not take the risk of investing the time or money necessary to create or perfect new 
products, without which our economy would suffer.”
2 
Most national governments offer patent protection to creative endeavors and liken the 
property rights afforded these endeavors to the property rights afforded physical 
property.  The CIPO website, for instance, states: “You can receive legal recognition for 
these endeavours in much the same way as you receive title to a piece of land.”
3 As 
Boldrin and Levine (2008) note, however, patents give the owner of ‘intellectual 
property’ (IP) a stronger form of exclusivity than the owner of physical property.  The 
owner of a plot of farmland has exclusive rights to use the land, but cannot prevent 
other farmers from competing with him/her.  IP owners naturally retain the right to use 
their IP but, in addition, can exclude others, including those who have purchased this IP, 
from competing with the IP owner. 
 
3. Why pharmaceutical patents may be counterproductive 
3a. Inefficiency   
Economists recognize that monopoly incurs an efficiency cost, but most contend that 
this is the price of progress.  This inefficiency, known as ‘deadweight loss’ (DWL), 
pertains to the non-realized sales of the drug to ‘price sensitive’ consumers – those who 
are unable or unwilling to pay the monopoly price but who are willing and able to pay 
the MC.  These sales are valued at more than their resource cost, so society gains if 
these sales take place.  But they don’t because a monopolist would lose money by 
doing so.  Why?  To make these sales, it would need to reduce its price and, by so 
doing, it would lose more revenues on its ‘price insensitive’ customers – those who are 
willing to pay the monopoly price – than it earns on its price sensitive customers.  It 
would be profitable to sell at a lower price just to its price sensitive consumers if it could 
prevent resale of the product to price insensitive customers.  But it is costly to prevent 
resale, as is clear from the controversies over pharma companies’ initial reluctance to 
sell at discounted prices AIDS drugs in low income countries.   
There is growing evidence that the DWL of pharma patents constitutes a large social 
cost.  Guell and Fischbaum (1997) estimate DWL in the US market to be in the order of 
60 percent of sales revenues.  As Hollis (2005) notes, DWL, not to mention the 
attendant human suffering, are likely much higher in resource poor countries.  These 






medication non-compliance (Tamblyn et al 2001; Schoen et al 2001; Lexchin and 
Grootendorst 2004; Gibson et al 2005, 2006; Goldman, Joyce and Karaca-Mandic 
2006) and the contribution of drug costs to personal bankruptcies (Himmelstein et al 
2009). 
3b. Profit expropriation 
The DWL of pharma patents is widely recognized.  Perhaps less well recognized is the 
fact that some of the potential profits conferred by patent protection are simply lost and 
hence unavailable to the innovator.  The reason is simple: Patents create high margins 
and high margins attract, for lack of a better word, ‘raiders’ – those who want to 
expropriate these margins.  (Economists use the more cumbersome term ‘rent 
seekers’.)  The potential profits from patent protection therefore decline, both by the 
profits actually expropriated and by the resources expended by the innovator to fend off 
the raiders.  Hence the threat posed by raiders dulls the financial incentive to conduct 
R&D in the first place.   
Profit raiders include drug resellers (those who engage in what is variously known as 
‘arbitrage’, ‘parallel trade’ or ‘drug re-importation’: buying drugs in low price jurisdictions 
and selling them in high price jurisdictions), counterfeiters (who infiltrate drug 
distribution channels with bogus copies of a patented drug), competing firms that 
develop therapeutically similar ‘me-too’ drugs (which are sufficiently differentiated to 
avoid patent infringement), generic drug firms (that challenge the validity of patents 
perceived as being weak), government price regulators, and, finally, drug insurers 
(which impose various reimbursement controls, and also impose a substantial money 
and time cost for applying for formulary listing).  It is difficult to quantify precisely the 
resources drawn into the battle over control of the pharma innovator’s profits, but the 
following should convey the scale of the problem.   
3b1. Counterfeiters. High margins and low transport costs make patented drugs an 
attractive target for counterfeiters.  Historically, pharma firms ignored the problem given 
that most contraband was sold in resource poor countries where potential profits were 
low.  This has changed.  Advances in counterfeit technology, the entry of organized 
crime syndicates into the counterfeit industry, and the introduction of patent protection 
(and hence higher drug prices) in several emerging markets following the 1994 
ratification of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) 
agreement (World Trade Organization 2009), resulted in large increases in counterfeit 
sales (Lybecker 2008).  This counterfeit is increasingly difficult to distinguish from the 
genuine product and is infiltrating developed country markets.  Pharma firms have 
responded by changing the design of their pills, tablets and packaging to make imitation 
more costly; they have also invested in radio-frequency identification and other 
technologies to secure their distribution channels from infiltration (Wertheimer 2008; 
Lybecker 2008).  Despite these efforts, losses from counterfeiting are estimated to be in 
the order of $45 billion (US) annually (Lybecker 2008).  Lybecker (2007) reports that 
counterfeiting remains a pervasive problem “impacting nations of every size and income 
level and drugs of every description.”   
3b2. Price regulators.  Government price regulation is another threat to pharma R&D; 
Lichtenberg (2007) estimates that a 10% decline in drug prices would likely cause a 5–6 
 
6% decline in US pharma R&D outlays.  Abbott and Vernon (2007) estimate even larger 
R&D disincentive effects of price reduction.  Not surprisingly, the pharma industry 
employs a cadre of lobbyists to prevent price regulation.  Despite this lobbying, most 
OECD countries have instituted some form of drug price control (US Department of 
Commerce 2004, Sood et al 2009).  Even the US federal government, arguably the 
most sympathetic to the pharma industry, has used price controls in its various drug 
plans (Hollis 2004). 
3b3. Drug re-sellers.  International differences in price regulation regimes and national 
income, as well as exchange rate fluctuations and other factors result in differences in 
the maximum price that a multinational pharma firm can charge in different markets 
(Hollis and Ibbott 2006).  These variations present pharma firms with a dilemma.  On 
the one hand, profit maximization requires that they charge as much as each market will 
bear, so that, for instance, poorer countries will pay less towards the cost of R&D than 
richer countries.  But drug resellers are quick to exploit price differences.  Moreover, 
price regulators in Canada and elsewhere mandate that they pay no more than what is 
paid in a set of comparator countries.  So listing at a low price in one country might 
cannibalize profits elsewhere.  Faced with this choice, a pharma firm might sacrifice 
profits in a country with limited willingness to pay (by delaying listing or listing at a 
higher than optimal price) to preserve more substantial profits in a country with greater 
willingness to pay (Grootendorst 2004, 2006). 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to eliminate all arbitrage opportunities.  For instance, Bart 
(2008) presents estimates of the value of the drugs resold in the EU as being in the 
order of EUR 5 to 6 billion in 2006.  Other threats loom on the horizon: according to 
Bate (2009), the US federal government is considering relaxing regulatory constraints 
on the importation of low cost prescription drugs.  
3b4. Drug insurers.  In most markets, firms sell their products directly to consumers.  
The pharma market is different.  Most consumers in developed countries have 
insurance that covers some or all of the cost of prescribed drugs, so pharma firms 
effectively sell to drug plans.  Many drug plans wield substantial bargaining power on 
account of their large size
4 and increasingly exploit this power to extract price 
concessions from pharma firms who wish to have their products listed on the drug plan 
formulary (Sood et al 2009).  These price concessions directly reduce the margins that 
are ostensibly there to recoup R&D costs.   
The price concessions are sometimes directly negotiated with drug plans.  For instance, 
the executive director of the public drug plan operating in the province of Ontario, 
Canada extracts confidential discounts off of branded drug list prices.  (The confidential 
aspect allows pharma firms to price discriminate.)  Other plans adopt a maximum price 
that they are willing to pay, not for tablets or pills, but for units of health generated by 
use of a new drug.  These health units are usually denominated in ‘quality adjusted life 
                                                        
4 France, UK and Australia, for instance, operate national drug plans that account for the majority of drug 
sales.  Federal states without national drug plans typically have large-scale plans operated by regional 
governments.  The Ontario government drug plan, for instance, accounts for over 40% of prescribed drug 
sales in the province (CIHI 2009).  Public drug plans in smaller Canadian provinces are currently forming 
consortia to gain additional bargaining power.  7 
 
years’ (or ‘QALYs’) – which measure both survival and quality of life gains.  Typically, 
drug plans’ willingness to pay for a QALY are well below consumers’ willingness to pay.  
The UK National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE), for instance, uses a 
threshold of £20 000 to £30 000 per QALY.  Consensus estimates of consumers’ 
valuation of a life year in normal health are closer to $100 thousand (US) (Murphy and 
Topel 2006, Jena and Philipson 2007).   
The use of QALY assessments reflects a growing tendency on the part of drug plans to 
assess value for money when considering whether, and under what conditions, they will 
reimburse a drug.  Whereas drug plans used to cover almost all new drugs that 
received regulatory approval, drug plans, as a whole, are becoming much more 
selective consumers.  This has reduced innovators’ margins in ways that are less 
obvious than for price discounts.  First, innovators face substantial costs in applying for 
drug plan reimbursement.  In particular, they are often required to submit budget impact 
assessments and provide estimates of their drugs’ value for money to be considered.  
These requirements reduce margins both directly (due to the cost of hiring ‘market 
access specialists’, contract research organizations and academics to carry out the 
studies) and indirectly (the time required for the evidence to be compiled and reviewed 
by drug plans reduces patent life).  Second, if drug plans do reimburse a costly new 
drug, they increasingly will cover it only if the prescriber provides written documentation 
demonstrating that lower cost options are not effective.  This prior authorization 
requirement effectively curtails demand given the time and hassle required to complete 
the paperwork.  Third, most employer-provided drug plans in the US provide financial 
incentives (such as reduced co-payments) to beneficiaries who use lower cost 
pharmaceuticals (Blumenthal 2006).  A variant of this approach used primarily outside 
of the US, reference pricing, limits drug plan reimbursement of all drugs in a group of 
therapeutically similar drugs to the lowest price drug in the group. 
An innovator, of course, can elect to forgo formulary listing; consumers always have the 
option of paying cash for drugs that are not insured.  But if the drug plan has a large 
market share, then exclusion from the formulary will markedly reduce sales.  The 
reason is that non-formulary drugs tend not to be used, perhaps because physicians are 
not accustomed to prescribing them (Wang, Pauly and Lin 2003, Wang and Pauly 
2005).    
In summary, patents afford innovators some market power, but more and more drug 
plans are exercising countervailing market power and, by so doing, are reducing 
innovators’ margins and hence the incentive to conduct R&D.  Many payers now require 
innovators to demonstrate that their new drugs provide sufficient value for money as a 
condition for reimbursement.  This has reduced margins both directly (by using low 
willingness to pay thresholds) and indirectly (by requiring firms to incur the time and 
expense of conducting economic appraisal studies).  The amount of resources drawn 
into the economic appraisal industry is evidenced by a review of the published literature.  
There are now in the order of 2,500 economic evaluations of pharmaceutical drugs 
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3b5. Brand and generic competitors.  The innovator will also engage rival drug firms, 
both generic and brand, in costly battles over market share.  Generic firms have an 
obvious financial incentive to enter large markets as soon as possible and will mount 
legal challenges to patents perceived as being weak.  Grabowski (2004) indicates that 
many of the top selling brand drugs in the US have been subject to these legal 
challenges.  He suggests that a generic firm might profitably challenge a portfolio of top 
selling drugs given that the payoff from prevailing in just one case would more than 
cover total litigation costs.  Brand firms defend against generic entry by applying for 
multiple, overlapping patents on top selling drugs, increasing the number of patents that 
a generic must successfully challenge to order to launch a product.  Frank (2007) notes 
that branded drug firms in the US now carry an average of 10 patents for each drug — 
as compared with an average of 2 a decade ago.  If generic entry is imminent, some 
brand firms will launch a generic version of its branded drug product – a so-called 
‘authorized generic’ – to compete with independent generics in the price-sensitive part 
of the market. 
Battles with prospective me-too drugs are also sometimes fought in the courts.  For 
instance, Pfizer attempted to block the market introduction of two competitors to Viagra, 
the first drug for male erectile dysfunction, claiming that they infringed on a patented 
physiologic mechanism of action.  More commonly, however, the innovator will concede 
entry to the me-too but promote its drug to physicians and patients to defend market 9 
 
share.  A recent study (Gagnon and Lexchin 2008) suggests that industry outlays on 
pharma promotion in the US are almost double the amount it spends on pharma R&D.  
Despite these promotional expenditures, innovators can expect to lose substantial 
revenues to me-toos.  Lichtenberg and Philipson (2002) estimate that the reduction in 
the present discounted value of sales revenues from me-too competition is four times as 
large as the reduction in revenues due to competition from generic drugs after patent 
expiry. 
The moniker ‘me-too’ is pejorative.  (Indeed, some prefer the term ‘follow-on’ drugs.)  If 
patients respond idiosyncratically to any one in a group of similar drugs, it is no doubt 
useful having alternatives.  Indeed, some me-too drugs are therapeutically superior to 
the pioneer.  The issue is that patents create the high margins that attract more me-too 
drugs than would otherwise be the case.  These me-too drugs, each of which incurs its 
own development and clinical testing costs, engage in costly battles with the pioneer 
over market share that dull the incentive to develop first-in-class drugs. 
3c. Patent extension 
Note that not all of pharma promotional spending is made to defend market share from 
me-toos.  Even if it faced no competition, economic theory predicts that the lure of high 
margins would cause a pharma firm to promote its patented drug to expand unit sales 
(Dorfman and Steiner, 1954).  Hence patents will induce more outlays on promotion 
than would exist in their absence.  The lure of high margins also provides incentives to 
extend patent life.  A pharma firm can use a variety of tactics to do so.  First, it might 
attempt to block or discourage generic entry by using any one of the strategies outlined 
in Hollis (2009) and European Commission (2008).  Second, the innovator might 
repackage its molecule in a new dosage form or bundle its molecule with other drugs; in 
either case, it may gain additional patent life.  Third, it might develop a new molecule – 
perhaps a metabolite or isomer – derived from the original molecule; this new molecule 
is in effect a ‘me-too’ version of its original product (Angell 2004).  The issue here is that 
the resources expended to help extend patent protection are socially wasteful; to the 
extent that these tactics are successful, they create additional DWL. 
3d. Increased R&D costs 
Patents also increase R&D costs when innovation is sequential, that is, when new 
products build upon patented discoveries or use patented techniques.  Consider, for 
instance, the challenges of developing new internet commerce software in the US.  As 
Lessig (1999) notes, large swaths of computer code that enable such software enjoy 
patent protection: “Patent No. 5,715,314, for example, gives the holder a monopoly over 
"network-based sales systems" - we call that e-commerce. Patent No. 5,797,127 forms 
the basis for Priceline.com and effectively blocks any competitor. Patent No. 4,949,257 
covers the purchase of software over a network.”  Widely diffused ownership over 
productive inputs makes it costly for innovators to develop new products, for two 
reasons.  First, bargaining costs are obviously higher, the greater the number of 
patentees that hold IP rights over inputs.  Second, any one patentee can attempt to 
extract the bulk of the profits associated with the sale of the new product by threatening 
to withhold consent to use its IP.  Hence ownership of ‘upstream’ research results can 
impede ‘downstream’ research.  This is what economists call the ‘hold-up’ problem. 10 
 
How susceptible is pharma innovation to this problem?  Historically, drug development 
was not sequential.  Scientists capitalized on chance discoveries made by assessing 
the therapeutic properties of very large numbers of synthetic molecules or naturally 
occurring substances.  But this hit-and-miss approach is being supplanted by a new 
paradigm of drug discovery that exploits an increasingly sophisticated understanding of 
human physiology, including therapeutic proteins, raw genomic DNA sequences, and 
cell receptors (Edwards 2008).  Many of the extant discoveries in these areas, however, 
have received patents and this increases the cost of conducting R&D (Heller and 
Eisenberg 1998; Merz and Cho 2005; Stix 2006; Boldrin and Levine 2008; Boyle 2008; 
Palombi 2009).  Why?  Firms contemplating introducing new products into such markets 
must anticipate the threat of legal action by patent holders.  One way to deal with such 
threats is to pay licensing fees, assuming that the entrant can make a mutually 
beneficial deal with possibly numerous patent holders.  Another is to simply wait until 
relevant patents have expired.  The potential entrant might also mount a legal challenge 
to the validity of patents perceived as being weak.  Yet another tactic is to amass a 
portfolio of patents so that the firm can credibly threat to counter-sue for infringement of 
some of its own patents.   
It is unclear to what extent promising avenues of research have been compromised or 
abandoned on account of this problem.  But there are telling anecdotes.  For instance, 
in 2006 a Boston jury ruled that two drugs marketed by Eli Lilly infringed on patents 
licensed by Ariad Pharmaceuticals (Garber 2006).  Lilly’s drugs were found to have 
infringed on a patented mechanism of action (the ‘NF-kB pathway’) that targets 
inflammation.  Since inflammation is prevalent in numerous diseases, this ruling will 
likely affect pharma R&D in a variety of therapeutic areas (and also encourage others to 
patent higher and higher up the mechanism pathways).  Heller and Eisenberg (1998) 
and Heller (2008) provide other anecdotal reports of research conducted by for-profit 
firms abandoned on account of hold up.  A survey conducted by Walsh, Cho and Cohen 
(2005) suggests that basic biomedical research conducted in academic and other not-
for-profit institutions has not been adversely affected.  (Many academics, evidently, 
simply ignore IP rights.)   However, there is little systematic inquiry into the issue. 
3e. Distortion of research directions 
Some promising drug compounds are not patentable, perhaps because they were 
previously disclosed or rendered obvious by scientific advances (Roin 2009).  The non-
patentability of such compounds, in turn, will discourage pharma firms from investing 
the considerable resources required to develop, test and shepherd them through the 
regulatory review process.  Likewise, drugs that been genericized could have potentially 
important, and patentable new uses.  But there may be sufficient R&D into new uses of 
off-patent drugs given the difficulty of enforcing patents on therapeutic indications.  
Hence, unlike some other forms of aid for pharma R&D, the patent system affects the 
choice of compounds to develop.  According to Roin (2009), the distortion caused by 
non-patentability is significant: “Untold numbers of other drugs have been screened out 
of development by pharmaceutical companies for reasons related to their patentability, 
perhaps including drugs for HIV, cancer, heart disease, stroke, diabetes, malaria, 
tuberculosis, and diarrhea—conditions that afflict and kill millions of people each year.  
Losing an effective treatment for any one of those conditions would be a tragedy, even if 11 
 
it offered only minor improvements in health outcomes.” 
3f. Administrative costs of the patent system 
Finally, I note that the patent system is costly to administer.  Patent applications must 
be assembled and examined for novelty, usefulness and non-obviousness.  Application 
preparation costs vary tremendously; however an application handled by a patent agent 
or attorney can cost in excess of $10,000.  A more substantive cost is incurred when the 
patent examiner makes an error, by either denying a meritorious application or 
approving an undeserving one.  The former error leads to worthwhile drugs being 
abandoned; the latter error precipitates legal disputes and contributes to hold-up and 
the other problems discussed earlier.  Jaffe and Lerner (2004) suggest that the error 
rate has increased in the last two decades on account of the exponential growth in the 
number of patent applications (about 1,000 applications are submitted to the US Patent 
Office daily); the difficulty in attracting and retaining examiners who possess content 
expertise; the difficulty of delineating contributions to the body of prior art in 
biotechnology, software, and other rapidly evolving areas; and the legal presumption in 
the US that an application is valid unless proven otherwise.  The result, they state is “a 
decline in the standards for granting patents, and the emergence of broad, apparently 
invalid, patents in particular industries undergoing rapid technological change.” 
There is growing evidence, then, that the pharma patent system is not serving the 
interests of either the pharma industry or consumers.  Whatever incentives it creates to 
conduct R&D into socially valuable new drugs is mitigated by DWL, the value of 
resources drawn into the battle over an innovator’s margins, the value of resources 
used by an innovator to expand its market and extend its patents, the increased costs of 
pharma R&D when innovation is sequential, distorted research directions and 
administrative costs.  The resources spent by raiders to usurp innovators’ margins are 
also socially unproductive. 
One remaining, putative advantage of the patent system is that they make public 
technological innovations.  Hence even if they do not fuel R&D, pharma patents may 
serve a valuable disclosure role.  But even this advantage is unclear.  Specifically, some 
claim that pharma patents are written in ways that effectively disguise the essential 
innovation so as to protect the innovation from challenges by generic drug firms and 
others (Edwards 2008).  In any event, given advances in methods of reverse 
engineering, a product patent disclosure is not necessary to learn about the chemical 
composition of a new drug.   
 
4. What are the alternatives to patents? 
4a. No intervention 
It is worth noting at the outset that government intervention (such as the provision of 
patent privileges or direct subsidies) is not always necessary for innovation.  In many 
markets, firms have sufficient incentive to incur substantial R&D costs without any 
assistance.  Boldrin and Levine (2008) describe the mechanisms, which include trade 
secrecy, first mover advantages (e.g. the innovator often enjoys an enduring 
reputational advantage, or failing that, can earn profits until competitors’ sales drive the 12 
 
market price down to MC), learning curve advantages (i.e. the innovator is more familiar 
with the underlying technology than are imitators), capacity constraints and other entry 
barriers (e.g. if each competitor needs to invest in productive capacity then there are 
limits to the number of firms that will enter the market), and the sale of complementary 
services (e.g. open source software developers earn profits on the sale of product 
support).   
What would pharma innovation look like without patents or any other form of 
government intervention?  Given the relatively low barriers to entry, removal of patents 
would hasten generic competition, decreasing profits and the amount of R&D spending. 
But profits would not decline to zero, as some commentators imply.  One reason is that 
pharma R&D costs would be lower: Abolishing patents on upstream research would 
decrease the cost of conducting downstream research.   
Sales revenues could also be substantial in a world without patents.  The reduction in 
margins following generic competition would reduce the number of me-too drugs 
entering the market, and lessen other forms of profit competition as well.  Moreover, 
generic competition would not be instantaneous.  Before 1987, the Canadian Patent Act 
permitted compulsory licensing of pharma drugs; generic firms could launch their own 
versions of a patented drug in exchange for a very modest royalty.  Even during this 
time, many branded drugs did not face any generic competition.  Of those that did, most 
enjoyed several years of exclusivity (Table 1).  When they eventually faced generic 
competition, innovators retained a sizeable market share owing to the habit persistence 
of physician prescribing (McRae and Tapon 1985).  Of course, this all occurred at time 
when drug plans were much less cost conscious than they are today.  Now, generics 
gain a much larger market share following entry owing to the reimbursement policies of 
major drug plans.  Nevertheless, one could imagine that should patents be eliminated, 
and should drug plans relax their rules concerning generic substitution, then innovators 
could earn substantial revenues. 
 
Table 1  Fraction of brand drugs that faced generic drug competition, and 
distribution of years of market exclusivity of these drugs, by brand launch 
year, Canada, 1980-1986. 






Distribution of years of market 
exclusivity of those facing generic 
competition 
   min median  max
1980 13  61.5% 2.0 15.8  27.9
1981 16  50.0% 1.0 9.0  22.5
1982 11  36.4% 5.0 6.0  13.0
1983 13  46.2% 7.0 10.0  21.3
1984 18  50.0% 5.0 12.0  20.3
1985 15  40.0% 6.0 10.6  19.3
1986 11  90.9% 3.0 9.5  14.5
Data Source: Health Canada Drug Products Database. http://webprod.hc-sc.gc.ca/dpd-
bdpp/index-eng.jsp  Retrieved June 5, 2009.  Data reflect oral solid medications (tablets and 13 
 
capsules) exclusively.  In some cases, launch dates were ascertained from the date that the 
drug received regulatory approval. 
 
The profitability of drug companies in a world without patents should not be overstated, 
however.   According to Scherer (2000), most patented drugs are commercial failures – 
they fail to recoup their development costs; the development costs of these drugs are 
essentially subsidized by sales on patented ‘blockbusters’.  But blockbusters would 
attract the most generic competitors and this would reduce the sales revenues used to 
finance the development of failures.  Expanding the amount of pharma R&D relative to 
amount of R&D that would exist in the ‘no assistance’ world therefore requires a pull or 
push program. 
4b. Pull programs based on the existing patent system 
Although there are many variants, all pull programs provide greater rewards to drugs 
judged to be more valuable.  One type is the current patent system: drugs that the 
market deems to be more valuable earn greater profits.  But the patent system creates 
DWL, wasteful profit competition and the other social costs previously discussed.  
Moreover, the market’s measure of value – willingness to pay – is a noisy measure of a 
drug’s value.  In most markets, consumers assess whether a good or service is worth 
the price; consumer willingness to pay in such markets is a reasonable estimate of 
social value.  But, as Hollis (2005) notes, pharmaceutical markets are extraordinary 
because the consumer neither chooses the medicine (the physician does) nor pays for it 
(the insurer does).  Physicians are delegated prescribing rights because they typically 
have much better knowledge about pharmacotherapy than do consumers.  Physicians’ 
knowledge, however, is still incomplete.  Physicians’ medication choices are sometimes 
deleterious to consumer health (Tamblyn et al 1994, Anderson et al 2008) or wasteful in 
the sense that expensive therapies are used in preference to equally effective, but less 
costly alternatives (Morgan et al 2005). 
Despite these problems, some commentators recommend that the patents system 
continue, but be modified or supplemented to correct some of its limitations and defects.  
Some proposals target problems in the patent office.  Jaffe and Lerner (2004), for 
instance, outline a program of reforms to reduce examiner errors.  These reforms 
include the institution of pre-grant opposition, whereby outside parties could provide 
information on prior art to the examiners before a patent is issued.  Bessen and Meurer 
(2008) would require patent applicants, especially those attempting to patent more 
abstract innovations common in the areas of software and biotechnology, to more 
precisely define the claimed innovation.  This would avoid the granting of overly broad 
patents, and hence reduce hold-up. 
Other proposals deal explicitly with pharma patents.  Danzon and Towse (2003), for 
instance, propose that multinational drug companies maintain uniform prices across 
different countries, thereby stymieing drug resellers, but offer to drug plans confidential 
rebates that are sufficiently large to induce them to purchase the drug.  Some proposals 
would help ameliorate DWL.  DiMasi and Grabowski (2007) recommend public drug 
coverage be extended to the uninsured.  Goldman et al (2008) target the related 
problem of medication non-compliance among those with partial insurance.  Currently, 14 
 
most drug plans and their beneficiaries share the cost of each prescription filled.  
Beneficiary cost sharing, in turn, leads to some prescriptions not being filled.  An 
alternative is for the drug plan to charge a lumpsum fee that would entitle beneficiaries 
to a medically optimal number of prescriptions over the course of a year.  (The fee is 
chosen so that the total beneficiary contribution remains unchanged.)  Because the per-
prescription cost is much lower under this scheme, compliance should improve. 
Various other proposals have been advanced to spur R&D into therapeutic areas where 
drug development costs exceed potential drug sales revenues.  These include diseases 
affecting only small numbers of individuals in rich countries (such as Paget’s disease, 
nephroblastoma, Creutzfeldt-Jakob Syndrome and other rare diseases, or pediatric 
uses of drugs that treat diseases common among adults) and diseases affecting large 
numbers of individuals in low income countries (such as drug resistant TB, malaria, 
schistosomiasis and other tropical diseases).  Stiglitz (2006), for instance, proposes that 
lump-sum rewards be used to promote R&D into therapies for malaria and other tropical 
disease.  Other proposals guarantee drug developers a subsidy on a fixed quantity of a 
drug or vaccine that meets pre-specified technical requirements.  This is the basis of 
Kremer’s (2002) Advanced Market Commitment (AMC).  Roin (2009) would grant non-
patentable drugs that receive regulatory approval a lengthy period of market exclusivity 
to help recoup development and testing costs. 
4c. Other Pull Programs 
The patent system allows innovators to recover sunk R&D costs by granting them 
exclusive control over use of a patented drug.  This control allows the innovator to 
restrict sales to those with the greatest willingness to pay.  The alternate pull 
mechanisms reward innovators via publicly financed lump-sum payments or royalties 
paid to the innovator by all other firms selling the drug.  The alternatives, therefore, do 
not artificially restrict unit sales.  Assuming imitation costs are sufficiently low, this 
should result in more firms selling the drug, which should lower both drug prices and 
margins.  The reduction in margins, in turn, would reduce DWL as well as parallel trade, 
counterfeiting, me-too drug proliferation, and other forms of profit competition.  It would 
also dull the incentives for innovators to expand unit sales via promotion or extend its 
patents.  Moreover, in some of the proposed schemes, all drugs – even those that 
would not have been patentable – are eligible for rewards. 
The alternative pull programs have yet one more advantage over patents.  To avoid pre-
emption by competitors, firms apply for patents early in the drug development process, 
well before the drug is marketed.  Regulations that delay market entry, such as 
heightened safety and efficacy standards, reduce effective patent life and hence profits.  
The patent system therefore distorts a pharma firm’s optimal launch date for a new 
drug.  The alternative push programs do not create these distortions. 
Placing new drugs in the public domain may, or may not, deal with the hold-up problems 
created by the proprietary ownership of therapeutic proteins, raw genomic DNA 
sequences, and the other ‘building blocks’ of drug discovery.  This depends on whether 
the building blocks come ‘bundled with’ the new drug or whether they are separate.  If 
they are bundled together, then placing the new drug in the public domain will 
automatically place the building blocks in the public domain.  If not, then the hold-up 15 
 
problem will remain. 
The prize/reward proposals can be categorized along several dimensions.   
4c1. Agency discretion.  First, they can be distinguished by the amount of discretion 
afforded the prize agency in setting research directions and monetary rewards.  Some 
would grant the agency much discretion.  Sanders’ (2007) Medical Innovation Prize 
Fund Act, for instance, would allow the agency to decide on reward amounts and 
identify priority disease areas.  The agency would be bound only by various guidelines, 
such as the guideline that more effective drugs should earn larger rewards.  Other 
proposals would see the agency reward all comers in proportion to the extent they meet 
some predefined social objective.  Hollis (2005) and Hollis and Pogge (2008) would 
reward a new drug in proportion to its measured impact on population health, while 
Grinols and Henderson (2007) would base rewards on consumer’s surplus (defined as 
estimates of drug plans’ maximum willingness to pay, less drug prices).  Others would 
assess social value by using firms’ assessments of the profitability of the new drug, 
either with the privilege of market exclusivity (Guell and Fischbaum 1995, Kremer 1998) 
or without this privilege (Levine 2009).   
DiMasi and Grabowski (2007) would appear to favor a formulaic over a discretionary 
reward system.  They express concern that under a discretionary system, ‘political rent 
seeking’ and lobbying may distort research directions.  Moreover, they suggest that for-
profit drug developers are best able to identify and pursue the scientific opportunities 
that will lead to socially valuable products.   
4c2. Division of social surplus.  The proposed reward programs also differ in the 
division of the social surplus of the new drug between consumers and the innovator.  
(The social surplus is the dollar value of the health gains created by the drug less the 
costs of developing, producing, marketing and distributing the new drug.)  Some would 
set the reward amount at a level that makes both consumers and the innovator better 
off relative to the current system.  In other words, the reward amount would exceed the 
patentee’s monopoly profits, but would be smaller than the social value of the 
innovation.  Hollis and Pogge (2008), for instance, propose a scheme whereby 
developers can elect to exercise their patent privilege or relinquish this privilege in 
exchange for a series of payments.  By making the scheme optional, developers can 
earn at least their monopoly profits.  Guell and Fischbaum (1995) and Kremer (1998) 
propose schemes whereby innovators would receive the present discounted value of 
their anticipated monopoly profits; the former would estimate monopoly profits by selling 
the new drug for a limited time in a test market, the latter would use an auction format. 
Other formulae provide developers with rewards that are less than their monopoly 
profits but greater than their opportunity costs.  In particular, Levine (2009) proposes 
that firms bid for the rights to drug candidates (these are promising compounds that 
have yet to subjected to large scale clinical trials).  Bids consist of royalty rates that 
would accrue to the winner from all firms selling the drug, should the drug clear all the 
clinical trials and gain regulatory approval.  The lowest bidder earns royalty income but 
is responsible for covering trial costs.   
Levine’s proposal is akin to the compulsory licensing schemes that have been used in 
Canada and elsewhere, but with one major difference.  Historically, regulators set 16 
 
compulsory license royalty rates at some arbitrary amount (Canada 1984), whereas 
Levine would let firms bid on the royalty rate.  A firm’s bid would depend on its ability to 
operate clinical trials and its expectations re: the likelihood that the drug will clear 
regulatory hurdles, the therapeutic value of the drug (vis-à-vis current therapies), the 
anticipated market size, and the number of competing firms. 
4c3. Setting rewards for a new drug.  Levine (2009) is one of two proposals that 
advocate an auction format to set rewards accruing to new drugs.  Kremer (1998) is the 
other.  He proposes that patent rights to a new drug be put for auction; the winning bid 
sets the reward amount.  Kremer’s auction is unusual, however, in that the winning 
bidder does not automatically receive the patent.  Instead, this depends on the outcome 
of a coin toss.  If it comes up heads, the highest bidder pays the innovator his bid and 
gets the patent.  If the coin comes up tails, the agency pays the innovator the highest 
bid and places the discovery in the public domain.  A defect of this scheme is that half of 
all new drugs remain under patent.  However, as Landsburg (2007) notes, this problem 
can be easily mitigated.  One merely throws “a biased coin that comes up tails, say, 90 
percent of the time. Then 90 percent of all patents end up in the public domain, which is 
not as good as 100 percent but far better than none at all.  We do have to give the 
private bidders some hope of winning so they'll take their bidding seriously.”  The 
Kremer auction also has provisions to help avoid bid rigging.  
The auction mechanism is widely used to elicit private information on value.  But Grinols 
and Henderson (2007) question the utility of the auction formats proposed by Kremer 
(and presumably by Levine as well) given the substantial uncertainty over the 
profitability of a new drug.  They argue that it is difficult to forecast profits owing to the 
introduction of competing drugs, and changes in disease prevalence and severity. 
The mechanisms proposed by Grinols and Henderson (2007) and Hollis and Pogge 
(2008) do not require profit forecasts.  Instead, the timing of reward payments is tied to 
the timing of the social benefits produced by the new drug.  Under both mechanisms, 
the social benefits produced by a drug depend on the total unit sales of the drug and the 
social benefit per unit sold.  The mechanisms take different approaches to benefit 
measurement.  Grinols and Henderson use willingness to pay (presumably by drug 
plans and cash paying consumers) in excess of MC.  Hollis and Pogge, conversely, use 
the health gain produced per unit of the drug.  The two measures are obviously related 
– presumably, willingness to pay should increase with health benefit – but there is an 
important difference.  Drug plans’ willingness to pay depends on at least two factors 
besides the drug’s effectiveness – the ability to pay of drug plan sponsors and the plans’ 
bargaining power.  Hollis and Pogge’s scheme relies exclusively on assessment of 
effectiveness. 
Firms participating in the Hollis and Pogge scheme would be required to sell their drug 
worldwide at a regulated price near the average cost of production and distribution.  In 
exchange, following market approval, an agency called the Health Impact Fund (HIF) 
would issue the firm a series of 10 annual payments.  Each payment represents a share 
of a reward fund; the reward fund share for drug x in a given year is equal to drug x’s 
share of the global health produced by all participating drugs in that year.  Health 
impacts would be measured using many of the same methods of health technology 
assessment currently used by drug plans when deciding whether or not to reimburse a 17 
 
new drug (Claxton et al 2008; Brazier et al 2007).  For example, if all participating drugs 
were estimated to have saved twenty million QALYs in a given year, and if drug x had 
saved two million of these QALYs, then it would receive ten percent of the fund.  This 
proposal therefore rewards drugs to the extent that they realize their raison d’être, that 
is, improving health. 
Although all new drugs could participate in the HIF, it would likely attract those drugs 
whose potential health impact is large relative to the sales revenue it could earn should 
the developer elect to exercise its patents.  In other words, it would likely attract drugs 
for tropical disease, drugs that confer large positive externalities, such as new 
antibiotics and vaccines, and drugs that are inherently unpatentable.  The HIF might 
also attract me-too drugs that elect to compete with existing patented drugs on the basis 
of price.   
4c4. Valuing me-too/follow-on drugs. Several schemes offer greater rewards to first-
in-class or breakthrough drugs, recognizing that they are generally more expensive and 
risky to develop than me-too drugs.  Hollis (2005) would measure a drug’s value, not in 
terms of its share of the total QALYs produced by participating drugs (as in Hollis and 
Pogge (2008)), but as the difference between the QALYs produced by a unit of the drug 
relative to the QALYs produced by a unit of the existing standard therapy.  
Breakthrough therapies would thus earn a larger reward per QALY produced than me-
too drugs.  However, monetary rewards also depend on the total QALYs produced so 
that should a me-too drug supplant a breakthrough drug, perhaps by virtue of an 
improved side effect profile, or greater efficacy, the me-too could earn a substantial 
reward.  The total reward accruing to the developer of the breakthrough drug would 
therefore depend on how quickly follow on drugs are launched and capture sales of the 
breakthrough product. 
Sanders (2007) would grant the reward agency some latitude in rewarding breakthrough 
drugs.  He writes: “In cases where a new invention is based upon an earlier invention, 
[the proposal] allows for sharing of rewards, so that a follow-on invention may 
completely replace an existing medicine, but the earlier product could still receive prize 
money, even with a zero market share, if the second product was based upon its 
technology. The aim is to give the correct incentives for products that are both first- and 
second-movers, since both are important.” The proposals advanced by Levine, Kremer 
and Guell and Fischbaum would treat breakthrough and me-too drugs symmetrically. 
4c5. Financing rewards.  All proposals, except Levine (2009), would finance rewards 
using public funds.  Public finance has both pros and cons.  On the one hand, because 
the technology to produce a new drug is a classic public good, prices should ideally be 
close to MC.  With publicly financed rewards, drug prices would be closer to MC than in 
reward schemes financed by royalties from imitators to innovators.  Public finance could 
also simultaneously address distributional goals.  A publicly financed reward scheme 
would distribute the financial burden of pharma R&D across taxpayers.  In a privately 
financed scheme, this burden is distributed across drug users.  The difference in drug 
prices would likely not be large for high volume drugs, but they could be for low volume 
drugs (including drugs used to treat rare disorders).  Moreover, like the patents system, 
a privately financed rewards scheme would not induce innovation into therapeutic areas 
in which R&D costs exceed potential sales revenue.  Hence a rewards scheme that is 18 
 
entirely privately financed would not serve the needs of those suffering from rare 
diseases, or those suffering from diseases prevalent in resource poor countries. 
Both the existing patents system and the proposed publicly financed rewards systems 
rely on contributions by different jurisdictions to finance pharma R&D.  One important 
advantage of a publicly financed reward system is that each jurisdiction’s contribution to 
the rewards fund would be transparent, making it easier to ensure that financial 
commitments are being honored.  International contributions to pharma R&D in the 
existing patents system, by contrast, are opaque.  The reason is that the agreement that 
governs patents and hence contributions to pharma R&D – the TRIPS agreement – 
regulates only minimum nominal patent terms.  Signatories to TRIPS can reduce their 
pharma R&D contribution using a variety of tactics.  First, they can increase the time 
required for review of a new drug’s safety, effectiveness and cost-effectiveness.  (To 
preempt competitors, firms apply for patents early in the development process.  Thus 
regulatory review reduces effective patent life.)  Second, they can set a high standard 
for patentability.  Third, they can exercise their prerogative to compulsory license the 
drug.  Fourth, public and private plans operating in the jurisdiction can impose 
reimbursement controls.  These policies reduce the monopoly rents that are ostensibly 
there to recoup R&D costs.  
Publicly financed rewards would also better align incentives.  Presently, national 
governments are responsible for pharma patent policy, but do not bear the full burden of 
higher drug prices; these costs are often borne by regional government drug plans or 
private plans.  These plans do not receive any political kudos for supporting innovation, 
and, indeed, are rewarded by plan sponsors for reducing prices.  Plan sponsors 
presumably care about innovation but the impact of price controls on pharma innovation 
is at best indirect and occurs only after a considerable lag.  There is also a strong 
temptation to free ride.  As a result these plans tend to focus myopically on cost control.  
A national government, conversely, could benefit politically from financing a pharma 
innovation fund: it would create lower drug prices, no doubt popular with constituents, 
and it would support pharma innovation in a very direct, visible way.   
A rewards based scheme has yet one more advantage over the patents system, at least 
for those living outside the US.  According to Civan and Maloney (2006), global pharma 
R&D is almost exclusively focused on ameliorating the burden of diseases prevalent in 
the US, even though the US constitutes less than half the global market.
5  They write: 
“The transmission mechanism of this perverse effect is cross-country importation 
policies and the pricing formulas of some countries that are based on the lowest price at 
which the drug is sold worldwide. These policies make it unprofitable to develop drugs 
to treat diseases where most sales will be in low-price countries.”  So, while many 
developed countries pay proportionately less than the US for pharma R&D, they benefit 
only in so far as their disease burden coincides with that in the US.  These countries’ 
‘free-riding’ comes at a cost of a paucity of research on diseases that are most 
important to them.  A publicly financed rewards system, conversely, could more closely 
align R&D to local disease priorities. 
                                                        
5 Civan and Maloney note that pharma sales revenues in the US for the year ending May 2004 was $168 
billion while the combined sales in Canada, Germany, France, Italy, UK, Spain, Japan, Australia, New 
Zealand, Mexico, Argentina and Brazil was $162 billion. 19 
 
Public finance also has various challenges.  Presumably, funds would be collected and 
prizes would be disbursed by a quasi-governmental, likely international, agency.  For 
this agency to carry out its mandate, it would require a mechanism to: i) set criteria for 
prizes (i.e. a formulaic or discretionary rewards system); ii) set the size of the prize fund 
at levels that encourage participation by innovators; iii) divide costs amongst the various 
sponsoring jurisdictions; and iv) establish ways to enforce compliance among sponsors.  
Clearly, innovators will not commit resources or support such programs if they suspect 
that the agency will renege on its promise to pay or if rewards are set too low.   
Some commentators (Farlow 2007; DiMasi and Grabowski 2007) are pessimistic about 
the prospects for such an agency owing to the difficulties of achieving consensus on 
both (i) which diseases will be the focus of R&D activities and (ii) a reward mechanism 
among sponsoring jurisdictions; Wei (2007) argues that achieving consensus among 
stakeholders even within a jurisdiction would be very difficult.  
Another drawback of public finance is the DWL of the taxes required to raise the prize 
funds.  This problem, however, might not be as daunting as it first appears.  The total 
public outlays under a rewards scheme might be of the same magnitude as current 
outlays on prescription drugs, estimated to be $750 billion globally in 2009 (IMS 2009).  
Most spending in developed countries is already publicly funded, either directly or 
through tax subsidies for private drug insurance.  Under a rewards scheme, drug prices 
would drop markedly – likely by a larger percentage than the percentage increase in 
unit volume.  Publicly funded drug spending should therefore decrease, and the savings 
could be directed towards the reward fund. 
4d. Push Programs 
The pull programs reviewed above provide rewards for the end products of the R&D 
process – new drugs.  Push programs, conversely, aim to reduce the cost to pharma 
firms of conducting R&D.  They include both general R&D subsidies, such as the R&D 
tax credits provided by the US Orphan Drug Act (Yin 2008), and programs that reduce 
firms’ cost of the three stages of the pharma R&D process, i.e., basic science, pre-
clinical research and clinical research.  These stages are described below. 
Basic Science.  Drug discovery begins with the basic science needed to understand 
the biological mechanisms and pathways pertaining to the disease state of interest. 
Pre-clinical research.  Scientists then develop drug candidates that exploit, to varying 
degrees, an understanding of these mechanisms.  Typically, this understanding is 
incomplete (Edwards et al 2009); drug discovery is thus still largely a hit and miss 
operation.  Indeed, the search for promising compounds typically proceeds by 
assessing the functional attributes of a very large number of candidates whose 
composition is guided by at best a tenuous (or at worst incorrect) understanding of 
disease mechanisms.  Candidates are first screened en masse for their efficacy (i.e., is 
the drug sufficiently potent?), toxicity (i.e., are there unwanted side effects?), and 
specificity (i.e., does it affect mechanisms other than its intended target?).  This 
procedure involves introducing the drug into cultured human cells contained in separate 
compartments or ‘wells’ that are arranged in a rectangular grid.  After exposure to the 
drug candidate, the vital status and the signaling behaviour of cells are monitored to 
assess toxicity and efficacy.  This process is called ‘high throughput screening’.  Once 20 
 
the high potency compounds have been identified from high throughput screening, they 
will be further tested in animal models to confirm in vivo activity.  At the same time, 
these lead compounds will be evaluated by a Discovery Support group to ensure that 
they exhibit physicochemical properties acceptable for developing into drug products.  
Based on these pre-clinical results, the best candidate compound will then be 
recommended for further development.  Once the compound is pushed into the 
development pipeline, formulators will then develop suitable dosage forms (capsules, 
tablets or suspensions) for the first human studies. To ensure these dosage forms are 
bioavailable, animal experiments are conducted to test the extent of absorption and 
bioavailability of the prototype dosage forms.  
Clinical research.  Drug candidates that emerge from this pre-clinical research are 
then tested in humans.  Testing begins first on a small number of healthy subjects to 
assess the drug’s toxicity at different dosage levels and dosing frequencies (in what are 
called Phase I trials), and, if successful at this stage, on up to 500 subjects with the 
disease to assess its therapeutic properties, sometimes at various stages of disease 
progression (Phase II trials).  The safety and efficacy of drugs that clear these hurdles 
are then tested in clinical trials involving many subjects with the disease (Phase III 
trials).  It is at this stage that investigators occasionally realize that the hypothesized 
disease mechanisms that guided the design of drug candidates turned out to be 
incorrect.  Candidates that are abandoned at this stage can be enormously costly.  A 
recent high profile example was the failure of Pfizer’s drug torcetrapib in phase III trials 
in 2006.  Evidently, this cost the company $1 billion.
6  The increasing rates of attrition, 
especially in late stage clinical trials (Mervis 2005), have dramatically increased the cost 
of bringing a new drug to market. 
4d1. Push programs targeting pre-clinical research 
Several commentators have proposed ways to address this problem.  Edwards (2008) 
presents a compelling case for the creation of large-scale, not-for-profit, public-private 
consortia that conduct the basic research necessary to design viable drug candidates 
and reduce the high rate of attrition of drug candidates as they progress through clinical 
trials.  
Edwards proposes that: i) to spread risk, the costs of this research be shared by all 
stakeholders (pharma industry, private charitable foundations, non-profit research 
institutions and governments); ii) the research findings be placed in the public domain to 
disseminate findings rapidly and widely so as to avoid duplication of effort, and to 
conserve the time and energy that is required to define and resolve IP rights over basic 
scientific discoveries; and iii) the research be conducted in partnership between 
academic and industrial scientists, so as to capitalize on their respective skill sets and 
promote collective learning.   
Several such initiatives have already begun.  The first such program was the Single 
Nucleotide Polymorphism (SNP) Consortium, founded in 1999.  This initiative has 
discovered more than 1.8 million SNPs, which are the primary building blocks of the 
                                                        
6 Pfizer shares hit by drug failure [Internet]. BBC. 2006 Dec 4;[cited 2009 Jun 18] Available from: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6205528.stm 21 
 
human genome.  This collaborative involves academic and industrial scientists working 
at four academic institutions: (Sanger Centre, Stanford University, Washington 
University (St. Louis) and Whitehead Institute).  Another initiative, the Structural 
Genomics Consortium (SGC), founded in 2003, has purified over 1,500 human proteins 
and has determined the structures of over 500 new human proteins, accounting for 
about 20% of all the human protein structures over the past 4 years (all on a budget of 
only $25M per year).  More recently, the Toxicogenomics Research Consortium was 
established to characterize the effects of drugs and toxins found in the environment on 
gene expression.  The Centre for Microbial Chemical Biology, launched in May 2009, 
seeks to understand how bacteria infect the human organism and how these attacks 
can be repelled using antibiotics.   
DiMasi and Grabowski (2007) express concern with public subsidy of pharma R&D, 
arguing, among other things, “because it is difficult to gauge the effectiveness of R&D 
activities, some shirking may occur from reduced efforts or from the pursuit of what is of 
purely scientific interest.  Attempts to deal with this problem by constructing contracts 
with a high degree of specificity can have their own adverse consequences, because 
they can stifle innovative approaches to problem solving.”  The success of these public 
private partnerships suggests that this concern is unfounded, at least for the conduct of 
basic research.  Indeed, it appears that industrial and academic scientists can 
collaborate in ways that satisfy both the goals of academic scientists and the goals of 
the project sponsors.  Pharma firms benefit because they can influence research 
priorities into directions that may yield commercially successful products and are kept 
abreast of developments in basic research.  Placing results into the public domain also 
reduces holdup and transactions costs for downstream research.  Likewise, academics 
profit from their access to the resources required to execute their research programmes. 
These collaborations have proved to be successful for the production of very basic 
scientific knowledge, such as the kind pursued by the SNP and SGC initiatives, but 
additional knowledge is needed to overcome the hurdles to drug development.  In 
particular, more needs to be known about the behaviour of cellular proteins (known in 
the industry as ‘targets’) that are implicated in disease pathways and how the activity of 
these protein targets can be altered pharmacologically in ways that ameliorate disease.  
There are about 3000 targets in the human genome that are potentially susceptible to a 
drug (Russ and Lampel 2005).  But according to Whitty and Kumaravel (2005), thus far, 
only a few hundred targets have been fully validated
 
in the sense that they have been 
shown to be therapeutically useful and modifiable by metabolically accessible, non-toxic 
drugs.  
Much more work is needed to validate the remaining targets.  Rai et al (2008) and 
Edwards et al (2009) concur that this work requires the expertise and resources of both 
the academic and industrial pharma sectors, and therein lies the problem.  Academic 
researchers collectively have superior knowledge of the therapeutic relevance of targets 
than do individual pharma firms.  Pharma firms possess the high throughput screeners 
and other specialized equipment required for the exercise.  They also hold two other 
key inputs for validation: i) proprietary collections of small molecules (known in the 
industry as ‘chemical probes’) which are needed to assess the functional attributes of 
proteins, and ii) the expertise of medicinal chemists to produce new ones.
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To accelerate the process of target validation, Rai et al (2008) proposes that a trusted 
agency provide a sort of match making service between academics and pharma firms.  
The agency would assess targets advanced by academics using the small molecule 
libraries owned by pharma firms and notify both parties if a match occurred.  If both 
parties wanted to deal, the agency would help broker an IP agreement.  Edwards et al 
(2009) suggest that target validation is best conducted using the open access, not-for-
profit collaborative model that has proved successful for the production of very basic 
research.  Their view is that pharma firms that contribute their screening equipment, 
molecular libraries and the expertise of their medicinal chemists and other scientists will 
gain more from the collaboration (by way to generating viable drug candidates) than 
they lose from divulging their molecular libraries to potential competitors.  To prevent 
free riding, they propose that membership should be restricted to organizations that 
make a meaningful, and agreed-upon, contribution.  
4d2. Push programs targeting clinical research 
Other pull programs proposals have focused on Phase III clinical trials.  Several 
commentators, including Lewis, Reichman and So (2007), Baker (2008), and Jayadev 
and Stiglitz (2009), have advocated for the public funding of Phase III clinical trials.  
Public funding of clinical trials does have much to recommend it.   
First, they can produce information that is more useful than the industry-funded trials 
mandated by regulators.  These latter trials are often placebo-controlled, typically focus 
on surrogate endpoints, enroll relatively healthy individuals, and are conducted for a 
relatively short period of time; moreover trial results are proprietary (Morgan et al 2000, 
Angell 2004, Baker 2008, Avorn 2006).  (This is not intended to be a criticism of the 
industry.  Indeed, this is rational economic behaviour given regulatory requirements, the 
behaviour of competing firms, and the time-limited nature of patent terms.)  Publicly 
funded trials, conversely, could disclose publicly the evidence on comparative drug 
effectiveness needed by prescribers to make informed choices.  Indeed, publicly funded 
trials are an extremely cost effective health care investment (Detsky 1989, 1990; Phelps 
and Parente 1990) that would otherwise be underprovided.  The US National Institutes 
of Health have run some landmark clinical trials, including the ALLHAT study of the 
efficacy of different anti-hypertensive drugs
7 and WHI study of postmenopausal 
hormone therapy.
8  The latter trial has transformed prescribing in the area. 
Second, public spending on clinical trials could also be relatively modest, for several 
reasons: 1) Public funding may temper the tendency of regulators to impose additional 
rules and conditions on the conduct of clinical trials (Yusuf 2004, Califf 2006); regulators 
would face the full cost of the administrative burden that they impose.  2) Governments 
likely face a cost of capital less than that faced by the pharma industry.  According to 
Grabowski, Vernon and DiMasi (2002), the pharma industry’s cost of capital is 11%.  
Moreover, drug R&D expenses are incurred up to 12 years prior to regulatory approval, 
so that capital costs account for about half the $802 million cost of drug development 
estimated by DiMasi, Hansen and Grabowski (2003).  3) Pharma firms rely on hospitals, 





execute trial protocols.  Payments to providers and institutions constitute a large and 
growing cost, especially if patients with the disease under study are few in number 
(Silversides 2009).  A centralized purchaser of these services might be able to negotiate 
better rates than individual pharma firms. 
A final justification for public funding of clinical trials is that it would relieve pharma firms 
of the single largest cost of drug R&D.  Clinical trials account for about 55% of the cost 
of drug development (Adams and Brantner 2006); public funding would therefore 
address the industry’s standard justification for patent protection.   
One drawback of public trial funding, echoing concerns raised by DiMasi and Grabowski 
(2007) of prize-based schemes, is that the public agency responsible for the trials may 
not be well informed of the most promising drug candidates.  The agency’s choice of 
drugs whose trial costs are eligible for public subsidy may also be subject to undue 
political interference. 
4e. Alternatives to the patent system: Push-pull Hybrids 
Another option is to combine push and pull programs to at once lower the costs of drug 
discovery and give developers incentives to bring therapeutically important new drugs to 
market.  Recall that the high cost of pharma R&D is ultimately due to a limited 
understanding of disease mechanisms in humans.  Many drug candidates are 
developed and advance to late stage clinical trials on the basis of speculative, and 
ultimately incorrect hypotheses about disease mechanisms.  An obvious remedy is to 
support the basic research needed to design viable drug candidates.  Edwards (2008, 
2009) argues that this support should take the form of open access, not-for-profit 
collaboration between academic and industrial scientists, supported by both the public 
and private sectors.  In principle, one could expand the scope of such collaborations to 
include early stage pre-clinical research on drug candidates.  This activity would yield 
families of molecules, with promising therapeutic potential and which are not 
encumbered by IP.  Next, pharma firms could use their expertise to shepherd promising 
drug candidates through the stages of mid and late stage pre-clinical research.  The 
mechanism proposed by Levine (2009) could then be used to finance the cost of clinical 
trials of candidates that emerge from this pre-clinical research.  Recall that rights to 
these candidate drugs would be auctioned.  The firm that bids the lowest royalty rate 
covers the trial costs but receives the royalty from all firms selling the drug, should the 
drug receive regulatory approval.  
This hybrid approach has much to recommend it.  First, the use of open source public 
private partnerships capitalizes on collective learning and the synergistic combination of 
the expertise and resources of the academic and industrial sectors needed to produce 
viable drug candidates.  By reducing the rate of attrition of candidates in late stage 
clinical trials, the creation of such consortia hold the promise to dramatically decrease 
the cost of pharma R&D.  Second, the mechanism capitalizes on the expertise of the 
pharma industry in identifying promising drug candidates, coordinating clinical trials and 
marketing and distributing drugs.  Indeed, the auction format would favor the firm that is 
most efficient in running the trial.  Third, the use of royalty based rewards in lieu of 
patents should enhance competition in the final dosage form drug market, reducing 
margins and hence DWL, wasteful profit competition and the other social costs 24 
 
identified earlier.  Fourth, because public subsidies are limited to the cost of basic, and 
early stage pre-clinical research, there is perhaps less scope for political interference 
than if applied research and clinical trials were publicly funded.  That being said, a 
public agency could in principle specify the parameters of the trial (e.g. comparators, 
endpoints, duration) so that the information generated could be useful to clinicians.  
Finally, unlike a patents-based reward scheme where longer trials directly reduce patent 
life, royalty payments would accrue indefinitely so that innovators would not face the 
same degree of pressure to minimize trial durations.   
 
5. Conclusion 
Many commentators take it as self evident that the patent system is the best way to 
support the development of new pharma drugs.  A growing body of evidence suggests 
otherwise.  Patents confer temporary monopoly power which innovators can use to earn 
profits on the sale of patented drug.  The DWL of monopoly power is widely recognized, 
but there are other social costs that are perhaps less well recognized.  These include: 1) 
the costs to the healthcare system of medication non-compliance due to higher drug 
prices; 2) the resources consumed in the battle over the innovator’s profits; 3) the 
resources spent by the innovator to expand unit sales and extend patents; 4) the 
increased costs of pharma R&D when this R&D builds on patented upstream 
discoveries; 5) the distortions in research direction caused by non-patentability of 
certain compounds; and 6) the administrative costs of the patent system.   
Some of these costs, specifically 2) and 5) and to a lesser extent 6), directly reduce the 
payoff to conducting R&D into therapeutically important drugs.  The costs associated 
with item 2) appear to be particularly large.  The innovator will need to spend resources 
fending off counterfeiters, resellers, competing drug companies (both generic and 
branded me-toos), and negotiating with and lobbying price regulators and drug insurers 
that appear to be myopically focused on cost containment.  Given the critical importance 
of the pharma sector in improving health, these disincentives to conducting R&D are 
simply unacceptable.   
There are alternatives to the patent system that avoid some or all of its downsides.  
These include public subsidy of the cost of pharma R&D, publicly financed lumpsum 
rewards for new drugs, and royalty payments paid by imitator to innovator firms.  All of 
these schemes would lower drug margins and hence reduce the cost associated with 
DWL, profit competition, as well as market and patent expansion.  Some argue against 
public finance, owing to problems of political interference, and informational problems.  
On this basis, a royalty-based scheme seems attractive.   
Although much more work is needed to operationalize and compare the merits of these 
alternative approaches, my sense is that they hold the promise to increase the 
productivity of the pharma R&D enterprise and decrease social costs and therefore 
deserve serious consideration.  25 
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